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1 *** PROCEEDINGS *** 2 3 DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. THE COURT: All right. Good morning, everyone. 4 5 Please be seated. And this is Szubielski vs. 6 Pierce, Civil Action Number 15-984. 7 So why don't we just first off have who's here. 8 Ms. Cline, for your side? 9 MS. CLINE: Good morning, Your Honor. This is 10 Joanna Cline of Troutman Pepper for the plaintiff, Gerry Szubielski. With me are my colleagues Mr. Larry Shiekman, 11 12 Courtney Munnings and Karli Cozen. And if it pleases the 13 Court, Ms. Cozen and Ms. Munnings will be handling the conference. 14 15 THE COURT: That would be fine. All right. 16 Mr. Wan and Ms. McCowan. 17 MR. WAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Ken Wan and 18 Allison McCowan for Defendant, David Pierce. 19 THE COURT: All right. Well, good morning to 20 you all. 21 So first thing, before we get to the Pretrial 22 Order, I wanted to address the schedule and the presiding 23 So right now we're scheduled to start on July 6th 24 which is Tuesday. I'd like to change the date to July 7th, 25 the Wednesday.

1 Is that a problem for either side? 2 MS. McCOWAN: No problem for us. 3 THE COURT: All right. And I'm sorry, Ms. Munnings I've seen before. Maybe I've seen you before. 4 5 What is your name again? MS. COZEN: Karli Cozen, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Cozen? 8 MS. COZEN: Yes. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Hold on a second. 10 And I'm right, your name is Ms. Munnings? 11 MR. MUNNINGS: Yes. 12 THE COURT: And when you're speaking, you can 13 take off your mask because you guys have industrial grade, 14 and I can't hear you through the mask. Okay? If you have 15 trouble hearing me, I'll take mine off, too, but just -- so 16 in any event, Ms. Munnings, Ms. Cozen, Mr. Wan. 17 All right. And so are you good with the date? MR. WAN: Yes, Your Honor. 18 19 Okay. So the presiding judge, it THE COURT: 20 seems like it's not going to be me. What I'd like to 21 propose to you is that you consent to have one of our 22 magistrate judges preside over the trial. 23 Do you have any -- so what I'd actually like to 24 do is can the two sides just confer with each other for a 25 minute and see whether you both agree to that or consent, as

the word is? If you don't, we'll move on. But talk to yourselves and talk to each other.

All right. What's the decision?

MR. WAN: Go ahead. Your Honor, I'll let Ms. Cozen talk.

MS. COZEN: Your Honor, we'd like to talk to our client to make sure he is okay with the magistrate judge --

THE COURT: How long does that take?

MS. COZEN: -- to preside over the trial. We're planning to talk to him later today.

THE COURT: Okay. That would be fine.

Okay. So let's do this then, I'll hear back from you later today on that. And meanwhile, I have gone over the proposed Pretrial Order, and I've tabbed a few things. So really what I was going to do was address the disputes that are in the Pretrial Order, the motions in limine, maybe ask you a question or two about the evidentiary objections. I'll tell you my reaction to the voir dire, but I think that's something that is probably something more better or more addressed by the person who's actually going to do the voir dire, not me.

So the proposed Pretrial Order, let me see my notes here. So one of the things was on Page 13, there was a disagreement about the testimony of Mr. Troxler and Dr. Maduka-Exeh. And I take it that we're agreed these

witnesses are available, so far as we know; right? 1 2 MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. And so what is it that 4 causes the plaintiff to think that Rule 32(a)(3) applies 5 here? 6 MS. MUNNINGS: The fact that the witnesses, 7 Scarborough and the 30(b)(6) witnesses were speaking on behalf of the Department of Correction, and therefore, their 8 9 interests were aligned with Pierce. 10 THE COURT: Well, they may be Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses, but that's a slightly different thing than what's 11 12 said in the Pretrial Order which cites Rule 32(a)(3). So 13 Rule 32 -- Rule 32(a)(3) says, An adverse party may use for 14 any purpose a deposition of a party. Right? So Mr. Troxler and the doctor are not parties. Or anyone who when deposed 15 16 was the party's officer, director or managing agent or 17 designee. 18 And the two may be Delaware's or the Department 19 of Correction's people, but they're not Mr. Pierce who's 20 sued in his individual capacity. Their officer, director or 21 his officer, director, managing agent, or designee. 22 So Rule 32(a)(3), that doesn't apply; right? 23 MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. But so don't sit down.

Was Mr. Troxler, and I imagine he was, and

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Dr. Maduka-Exeh, were they offering Rule 30(b)(6) testimony?

MR. WAN: Your Honor, my understanding is that

Mr. Scarborough wasn't and the remaining three were.

THE COURT: I don't think we're talking about Scarborough.

MR. WAN: Yes, Troxler and Dr. Maduka-Exeh as 30(b)(6) deponents for the Department of Correction.

THE COURT: All right. And so the Rule 30(b)(6) testimony, why can't they offer that, because after all the Department of Correction is an entity. They can't actually call it as a witness.

Isn't that what Rule 30(b)(6) testimony is for is to get the position, among other things, of a corporation?

MR. WAN: Well, Your Honor, but my understanding is that if these witnesses are available, and that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) applies. So to get former testimony in, they still have to show the unavailability.

advisement, but I think it's the case, but I'm not a hundred percent sure, that because it was corporate testimony, just because Mr. Troxler and the doctors are both actually available individually, that I don't think trumps the representative nature of the testimony. But I'll check that out because I don't think I actually had to decide that the

last time we had a trial.

And so we'll get back to you. But in any event, Rule 30(b)(6) is what you're relying on, and I'll figure that one out.

So then there was, also, on Page 16, there was this about the parties stipulate to the following and then there's a sentence saying, Evidence relating to the 2020 State indictment against plaintiff is excluded, but you can't reach the precise contours of the evidence to be excluded.

Is there something here that I can resolve?

MS. COZEN: Your Honor, I think the precise

disagreement here is what the motion in limine covers. It's

our position that the motion in limine covers any

investigation related to this indictment that postdates the

veto. The defendants want to limit that to specific dates

listed in the indictment, and we don't feel that that is a

fair thing. We think anything that postdates the veto, any

investigation into these allegations related to our client

are no longer relevant for the claim in this trial.

THE COURT: Well, so let's assume,

hypothetically, that the veto occurred on -- and I forget

the exact date, but October 1st of whatever year it is we're

talking about. And on October 2nd, Mr. Szubielski was

arrested in the prison with a pound of cocaine and the

1 Warden now said, See, would that be irrelevant?

MS. COZEN: No, Your Honor. So the indictment is specifically about allegations that range between May 13th, 2019 to September 20th, 2019.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's a helpful thing to say, but -- and I think that's a different issue because you're saying anything that postdates the veto, which I think was in 2016 or 2017 and, you know, talking about 2019 to 2020, you're in a much better position. And that's the reason why I was asking the question because you have then or seemingly to me made it a much broader thing you were trying to accomplish.

But are we really just talking about 2019 to 2020 now?

MS. COZEN: So we're talking about those allegations in 2019 and 2020. It's our position that, let's say, the allegations were investigated in December of 2019, which would be outside the time frame that defendants have articulated. Those would also be --

THE COURT: I'm sorry to interrupt, Ms. Cozen, but of course the indictments have dates in them. The activity that is charged in these indictments, what's the earliest date where the indictment says something happened?

MS. COZEN: May 13th, 2019.

THE COURT: Okay. And the date that Warden

Pierce vetoed the security or classification, that was in 1 2 2017 or 2016? 3 MS. COZEN: 2015, Your Honor. THE COURT: 2015? Okay. 4 5 MS. COZEN: It was October 2015. 6 THE COURT: Even better for you. All right. 7 I've got your position. 8 How is that relevant? 9 MS. McCOWAN: Your Honor, we agree with that. 10 So if you look at our position, we agree that we would introduce the indictment. We wouldn't cross the plaintiff 11 12 on the indictment. But what we weren't able to reach 13 agreement on, and if you look at plaintiff's position as 14 written in the pretrial conference, they would like to 15 exclude Mr. Szubielski's involvement in any contraband which 16 would be pre-veto and post-veto and any investigation --17 THE COURT: Well -- yeah, keep going. Sorry. 18 MS. McCOWAN: Any investigation that may have 19 led to the charges that were indicted. What we will show at 20 trial is that Mr. Szubielski was under constant 21 investigation, at least from as early as 2014. So during 22 our discussions, it appeared that plaintiff was trying to 23 keep those investigations out for this motion in limine. THE COURT: Okay. And let's assume, just as a 24

round number, that the veto was October 1st of 2015.

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don't know, I was going to say don't sit down, but in your case, if you want to sit, please sit. MS. McCOWAN: It's fine. THE COURT: Ms. Munnings, do you agree that your motion in limine doesn't include anything that occurred before the veto? Oh, I'm sorry, Ms. Cozen or sorry --MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor. We agree that anything before the veto is not included. THE COURT: All right. Do you have stuff after the veto that you want to get in? MS. McCOWAN: Well, as Your Honor had mentioned in the hypothetical, there are continuing contraband allegations that we interviewed or we are preparing to introduce as evidence after the veto that continue to prove that Mr. Szubielski was -- may be smuggling contraband in while he was in the SHU. We think that is important to negate the retaliation claim. THE COURT: So can you be a little more specific because to the extent --MS. McCOWAN: Your Honor, I believe the last piece of evidence was the 2018 incident report. THE COURT: And the 2018 incident report related to something that, according to the report, occurred in

MS. McCOWAN: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And when you say "the last," you mean the one closest in time to 2015? MS. McCOWAN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MS. McCOWAN: So Your Honor, our evidence list, we have incident reports stemming from 2009 to 2019 that we would argue show a pattern of conduct, among other things, to negate the allegation that Mr. Pierce retaliated. THE COURT: Wait. I lost you there for a Let me just go to -- so on your list of exhibits, second. and you helpfully have included a date of pretty much everything, there's four things in 2017 and 2018. And the first three, and these are Exhibits 9 through 12, the first three are called Incident Reports and so there's Incident Reports on May 19th and October 27th of 2017. Do these have to do with contraband? MS. McCOWAN: I believe -- I believe so, Your Honor. I can confirm. THE COURT: Well, I guess what I'm wondering is, even if they do, it's two years or not quite two years, a year and eight months or so after the Warden's veto. How does that help prove a relevant fact for you? MS. McCOWAN: Well, I would -- I believe at that point he had been, Mr. Szubielski had been moved out of the classification that he was in. So we would propose that

that confirms Mr. Pierce's belief that should he be moved down to a lower security than maximum, he would engage in this contraband conduct in further detail than he was in maximum.

THE COURT: But --

MS. McCOWAN: And Your Honor, I understand that there may be a relevancy objection here, but I don't think that these have anything to do with the indictment. And we agree that we're not going to talk about the indictment or cross their plaintiff about the indictment.

THE COURT: And you also have listed incident reports in 2013, 2014, 2012, 2009. To the extent you're trying to disprove retaliation, aren't those a whole lot more relevant because Mr. Pierce, whatever his qualities may be, he wasn't actually writing down or thinking, yeah, two years from now, this is going to occur. And you know, it's a forward-looking decision that he made.

So what's relevant to -- because after all, what I think the issue here boils down to is do you believe Warden Pierce when he said this was his concern? And you know, it seems to me you have enough, without knowing what all these incident reports are in particular, that you have enough incident reports predating the 2015 so that they're probative and relevant. And so, yes, the indictment, as far as I'm concerned, that's out.

But it strikes me that the incident reports from 2017 and 2018 are incredibly prejudicial. They have nothing to do with Warden Pierce's state of mind in October of 2015. And you know, I think as a proposition, they're essentially irrelevant.

Now, they might be relevant if Mr. Szubielski takes the stand, depending on what he says. That's a different issue. But just in terms of tending to prove or disprove the underlying facts that are at issue here, I think they're pretty much irrelevant. And to the extent they are relevant, I think they're incredibly prejudicial, and that whatever probative value they might have would be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the plaintiff. And of course, these things all occurred after other people, I forget who, eventually maybe -- Warden Pierce was the one who eventually approved his declassification.

But in any event, by the time this occurred, you know, he had been lowered down presumably because people thought he could be lowered down. So I don't see it as being something that, absent something that Mr. Szubielski or his counsel say, opens the door. I don't think these should be things that you're planning on getting in and certainly not things that the jury should be hearing about in any opening statement.

All right?

MS. McCOWAN: We understand, Your Honor, but the reason that we couldn't come to agreement on the motion in limine was that their position was that you couldn't introduce anything about contraband or any investigation, even around the veto.

THE COURT: All right. Well, apparently they backed off from that position.

MS. McCOWAN: Okay.

anything that happened before, let's say, October 1st, 2015 or whatever the relevant date is, I'm not excluding anything that happened before. And I don't think I've been asked to exclude anything that happened before, so to me, that's a pretty bright-line dividing point.

You know, if you have something that was immediately afterwards, you know, if it turned out that Investigator Roberts testified or maybe even Warden Pierce said, Yeah, I was told, and then a few days later the investigation came to fruition, that would be one thing. But that's not what we're talking about.

MS. McCOWAN: We understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think those were the only two things in the body of the Pretrial Order that were in dispute. There is a statement which is true

that it's scheduled for a three-day jury trial.

How many hours per side should I allot for this? And so to make sure everybody is on the same page, when I ask that question, you know, I'm going to give you a certain amount of time in hours to do your opening statement, your direct examination of witnesses, and your cross-examination of witnesses. Closing argument is separate. We'll determine that somewhere down the road during the trial.

And from looking at the witness list, which I did, it looked to me like these are all fact witnesses.

There's no expert witnesses.

Is that right?

MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So how many hours do you think you need under that formula?

MS. MUNNINGS: Your Honor, how many hours are in a trial day?

THE COURT: That's a reasonable question. Six.

But on the first day, the jury selection, which doesn't count against this time, that will take probably in the vicinity of two hours. So there will be, you know, somewhere in the neighborhood of three and a half to four hours on the first day, and then six hours on the second day, and six hours on the third day.

MS. MUNNINGS: Your Honor, six to eight hours.

1 Eight hours. 2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wan, what do you 3 say? 4 MR. WAN: Eight hours sounds fine, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Well, yeah, yeah. So I'd prefer you 6 took a different attitude which would be how much do you 7 need? 8 MR. WAN: Well, Your Honor, based on, I guess, 9 my experience two weeks ago, I forget the time. I think it 10 was between six or seven. So maybe it was like maybe a hair 11 less, but that's my recollection from my paralegal, 12 Mr. Buton (phonetic). 13 THE COURT: All right. So, Ms. Munnings, how 14 long do you imagine your client testifying on direct 15 examination? 16 MS. MUNNINGS: An hour and a half. 17 THE COURT: All right. And I realize these may 18 be somewhat hypothetical answers at this point, but how long 19 do you imagine an opening statement for your side being? 20 MS. MUNNINGS: Thirty minutes. 21 THE COURT: Okay. I forget, Mr. Wan, in the 22 trial we just had, did we do the closing arguments on day 23 three or day four? MR. WAN: Day four, Your Honor. I think we let 24

the jury out early on day three, and then we, on the second

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half of day three, I think we finalized the jury instructions and the verdict sheet, and then you kind of let us go to prepare closings.

THE COURT: Okay. So eight honestly seems more than is necessary to me. You know, I say that. I give patent cases 12 hours, and the complexity of those is ridiculous. So I'm going to say six-and-a-half hours a side is what -- and so I'm making these rulings on the assumption that actually some other judge is going to have this. I'm certainly not binding them to these rulings, but I would expect probably that they will go with whatever I say. But they may not.

But it seems to me like six-and-a-half hours a side is enough and that will also give the reasonable opportunity to possibly do closing arguments on the Friday because it is a short week. So that's what I'm going to put down for that.

All right. So the motions in limine. And I believe the first one is the motion in limine that we kind of addressed. That's the relating to the Plaintiff's State indictment. So I think that one is resolved, as I've already said.

Thereafter, there is defendants -- these are all then after that Defendant's motions, I guess. So Mr. Wan, Defendant's -- well, actually the way this is is a motion in

limine regarding damages. And so I understand the Defendant's position, and I don't know whether the Defendant has shared with you, as I imagine they might have, that basically this motion came up in a trial that I had with Mr. Wan, and Mr. Pierce, and some other people a few weeks ago.

Have you heard about that?

MS. COZEN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, so what is your theory as to why you can ask for a specific dollar amount, because I believe in your response you cite a case in which there was testimony about what the damages should be which is not something that's going to be happening in this case. So I thought the case you cited wasn't really on point.

What's your theory as to what it is you want to do or why you can do it?

MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor. I've had a chance to relook at the cases, and we do agree that in closing we cannot suggest a specific dollar amount for pain and suffering damages based on the current case law. We don't agree that we can't suggest a methodology as long as that doesn't include a specific dollar amount, but I do understand Defendant's position and have relooked at the case law and agree a specific dollar amount will not be

suggested.

THE COURT: So do you have an idea, because I think you're right, everything you said, and do you have an idea of what sort of methodology suggestion you have in mind or is that still to be determined?

MS. COZEN: Your Honor, that's still to be determined based on our trial strategy.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I did have to look at this in this last trial with the State, and as I said, I think Ms. Cozen has correctly stated what the law is.

I'm sorry, Mr. Wan. Do you have something you want to say?

MR. WAN: No, I just want to say that's correct. While she can't suggest a specific amount, nor can she have a specific dollar amount in her methodology, she can suggest some kind of methodology like in the other case.

THE COURT: Right. So for example, in the last case, the Plaintiff's attorney took the number of hours and tried to give the jury some argument as to, you know, the impact that would have on a person, and then suggested they figure out what that impact is and multiply it by the number of hours the person was arguably wrongfully in solitary confinement. You know, the trick is to make sure that you don't get to some place where all they have to do is math,

and they get the answer.

You understand? But in any event, you can think about that, and if you have any concern that you might be passing some line, you can certainly bring it up later. But I'm sure, in the first instance, you can probably figure this out, as you already have.

So that resolves Defendant's motion in limine regarding damages. Essentially, the motion is granted in light of the Plaintiff's concession.

And then the second motion in limine of the Defendant, oh, yeah, was about the time in solitary. And maybe I would ask the State here, because this was not an issue in my last trial, what is -- you know, there's points in your brief or your motion where you're talking about confusion of the issues, and this, and that.

I wasn't entirely convinced that any of this was likely to confuse a jury, but why don't you tell me what your best argument is before I get a response.

MR. WAN: Yes, Your Honor. I think that there is a danger here because if you look at -- this whole case is basically whatever damages Mr. Szubielski sustained, you know, if there is liability over that one-year period, so we're talking about all these other periods. And I think there is an issue where they're not looking at just the one year, they're looking at all the other years beforehand and

may inappropriately apply that to this case.

agree, it doesn't.

THE COURT: But if that were the case, couldn't

I just take care of that by saying, you know, Jury, there is
no issue about the solitary confinement before the Warden's

veto?

MR. WAN: Well, I'm a little nervous, Your

Honor, because I think in their response, they mentioned the whole eight or nine years was relevant for damages, and I don't think it is.

THE COURT: Well, so imagine this, you're on Captain Bligh's ship 200 years ago, and you do some offense for which you get 20 lashes. And then after he's given you the 20 lashes, he puts on ten more that's against the rules.

Do you think the fact that you got 20 lashes beforehand impacts how much the last ten lashes hurt?

MR. WAN: No, Your Honor, I think -- I, too,

THE COURT: Actually, I think it does.

MR. WAN: But I guess your analogy, but I think in front of a jury, though, that's what I'm worried about.

Correct. We are only focused on, in your instance, the last ten lashes. But in front of a jury when they hear that, the State's concern is that now they're going to say, yeah, there's one year, but there's all these other years he was held in there.

THE COURT: And isn't the jury also going to hear -- I mean, they're going to -- isn't Warden Pierce -- I can't remember. I may have confused this with something else. Aren't some of the -- I forget.

Do some of the documents that the people want to introduce, I mean classification decisions and things, don't they have sort of this history? I mean, are you suggesting that the jury should essentially not know what he was up to before the Warden denied the reclassification?

MR. WAN: I think it's suffice to say, yeah, he was in maximum security. The length, I think, is kind of the issue, especially when my worries about the damages part, Your Honor, is really the main concern over this. I think there could be some confusion as well, but I think Your Honor thinks that that may not be the case.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Wan. Your side, Ms. Munnings?

MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor. We believe that the issue of confusion can be cured with a jury instruction describing what the damages would be for.

THE COURT: And so I am correct that in terms of mental anguish, and hardship, and the sort of, you know, going crazy perhaps, whatever it is that Mr. Szubielski might say about this last year, is there going to be any other evidence, maybe medical records or, I don't know,

something else that's going to, I don't want to say support, but sort of add to the Plaintiff's own testimony about how terrible it is?

MS. MUNNINGS: Yes.

THE COURT: And that would be?

MS. MUNNINGS: There are the -- well, part of the disputed evidence is or exhibits is photographs of the prison cell, and we'd like to, if we can't use those, we'd like to be able to get pictures of the cells.

THE COURT: Okay. So actually I did see that.

The objection to that is that they were produced in the

CLASI litigation pursuant to a Protective Order issued by

now retired Judge Sleet.

MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So since he's not around to allow the release of the pictures, I think I can do that in his place. I feel pretty confident that, in fact, if he were still on the bench, he would do that. So you're going to be able to use the pictures. And perhaps -- I would appreciate it if you prepared the shortest possible order that I would sign authorizing you to use these pictures so nobody's, you know, subject to contempt of court orders down the road.

Okay?

MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: So if you could do that and submit 2 it. 3 And I'm sorry, I lost my thread here. So we 4 were talking about corroboration, so yes, you were talking 5 about the pictures. True. 6 Anything else that you have in mind right now? 7 MS. MUNNINGS: There are also medical records 8 from 2015. 9 THE COURT: Do the medical records give a flavor 10 of, for lack of a better word, a man going crazy? 11 MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor. 12 I mean, just because I ask a leading THE COURT: 13 question, you don't have to answer it yes. I mean, is 14 that --15 MS. MUNNINGS: Yes. THE COURT: That is your view? 16 17 MS. MUNNINGS: Yes. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 19 Well, so I'm going to -- oh, yeah. Okay. 20 the description in the complaint that is a key piece of 21 evidence in your case, isn't Mr. Szubielski going to say 22 that person who's person number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, 23 whichever one he was, doesn't that tell you how long he was in solitary confinement? 24 25 MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What about that?

MR. WAN: Your Honor, Mr. Pierce's testimony is that he never ever saw the complaint, so he wouldn't have identified it any way.

THE COURT: Well, so right, but presumably the complaint is going to come into evidence; right?

MR. WAN: I think from your ruling from the last trial, I think only for state of mind, but -- well, actually, I don't know, Your Honor. I think he --

THE COURT: So the difference here is the complaint is the main, is one of the Plaintiff's main pieces of evidence of saying that Warden Pierce, you know, could identify Mr. Szubielski as a complainant; right?

MR. WAN: That's -- yeah, that's their theory of the case is my understanding.

THE COURT: And I could tell them, you know, me telling the jury, it only comes in for -- it doesn't come in for the truth of the matter asserted. I mean, it's going to be pretty hard for the jury to ignore that Mr. Szubielski is going to say, Yeah, the guy that was in solitary for seven years is me and who has whatever psychiatric diagnoses he has. So I think you're fighting a battle that you kind of -- it seems to me it's pretty close to impossible to actually do. And what's more is I think it is relevant to damages.

You know, one of the things, you may recall this, Mr. Wan, the expert was saying in the last case was or even quoting the U.S. Supreme Court was, you know, sort of like, you know, the cumulative effect of going crazy.

MR. WAN: Your Honor, I'm sorry to interrupt.

I'm looking over Plaintiff's exhibit list. I don't actually see any medical records postdating the veto. Maybe I'm wrong. I was just looking quickly because I didn't really recognize which exhibit that was.

THE COURT: Well, I can't -- I see something called Contact Notes for 10/14/15.

MR. WAN: Right, which I think predates the veto.

THE COURT: I forget. I think that might have been Ms. Munnings. Maybe it was you, Ms. Cozen, I don't remember.

Somebody, do you actually plan to introduce medical records?

MS. COZEN: Your Honor, we do have some medical records that reference Mr. Szubielski's mental health condition, and we think those are relevant sort of to show the negative impact that an extra year in solitary confinement could have on someone with his mental health conditions.

THE COURT: Do you know offhand, looking at the

24 exhibits that are listed for your side, which medical 1 2 record you're talking about? 3 MS. COZEN: For instance, there is a letter which would be Exhibit 6 that discusses the need for our 4 5 client to be in --6 THE COURT: Right, but that's from 2008. 7 MS. COZEN: Correct, Your Honor. I don't think 8 we plan to introduce medical records that postdate the veto 9 regarding Mr. Szubielski's mental health condition; however, 10 he may testify about that on direct. 11 THE COURT: Sure. No doubt. 12 MS. COZEN: And additionally, the doctors who are fact witnesses may testify about his. 13 14 THE COURT: Wait. I'm sorry, which doctors? 15 MS. COZEN: There are a few doctors that were 16 30(b)(6) witnesses and --17 MS. MUNNINGS: Drs. Fink and Maduka-Exeh. THE COURT: And did they actually testify about 18 19 Mr. Szubielski specifically as opposed to general policy? 20 MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor. They talked 21 about his case, and they had reviewed his medical records 22 and the medications that he was on. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Actually, that reminds me: 24 In terms of the Rule 30(b)(6) question that you raised 25 earlier and I said, I would take under advisement, it would

be helpful for me if you would get the transcript, which you presumably have, of Mr. Troxler and the doctor and submit them to me with a letter highlighting in yellow or some other color than red or green what portions of the testimony -- you know, this doesn't have to be your final decision, so to speak -- but which portions of the testimony you're trying to get in. That might help me think about this.

MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

So basically I'm going to let in testimony about what I believe are seven years in the Secure Housing Unit, or solitary, or what have you. And I suggest the Defendant possibly propose a limiting order, a limiting instruction that I could give about the history as to what it is — well, why don't you see what it is. You know, at a minimum, it will have to say any damages are for the time period from October 24th, 2015, to, I guess, October 11th, 2016. And that's what I think it should say at a minimum, but maybe you all can think of something better.

All right. I think that was -- okay. So I think that takes care of the motions in limine. I did -- wait. Hold on a second. I did look at the exhibit list which -- yeah. Well, I see actually, of course, the Pretrial Order for the doctor and Mr. Troxler has the

proposed designations. They seem pretty modest. That doesn't mean they're admissible, but they do seem like they're maybe 12 pages total between the two of them.

So in any event, if you would submit that. And to the extent that, you know, I need -- it would probably be better to just submit the whole thing so I have any context if I have a question about something.

I did wonder on the Plaintiff's -- so I noted, I went through and I noted that you had your Plaintiff's exhibit list, and there were some objections from the Defendant. And some of them did not seem like the sort of objections I could form any reasonable view of in the abstract.

Exhibit 16, 17, 18 and 24, they seemed like things that I couldn't come up with a theory as to why those were actually admissible for the Plaintiff. You know, the Settlement Agreement and exhibits for the lawsuit, the signed Settlement Agreement, the complaint in some case in 2019, and a Delaware online article in 2019. You know, there seem to be a lot of problems. You know, relevance and hearsay spring to mind.

Do you have a theory that you want to explain to me as to why those things should be admissible?

MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor. I'll start by

saying we withdraw Exhibit 24. We've reconsidered in light of Defendant's objections and agree that we will not introduce that as evidence --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. COZEN: -- in this case. Regarding
Exhibit 17 and 16, I can discuss those together because
they're both --

THE COURT: They're the same thing?

MS. COZEN: Yes, they're both versions of the same thing. Defendants object to those on relevance grounds. Now, we feel they're relevant and they show conditions of confinement for prisoners like our client, Mr. Szubielski, who was housed in solitary and the poor mental health treatment he was getting during that year. The Settlement Agreement was signed in 2016, I believe.

THE COURT: August of 2016.

MS. COZEN: August of 2016. So all of those changes were not yet implemented, and it shows that they could have been. It shows that there is a feasibility of these different improvements that our client did not benefit from in that one year, and we think that is directly relevant for showing damages and the poor conditions our client was facing from 2015 to 2016.

THE COURT: But your complaint is not that he didn't get good treatment in solitary confinement, it was he

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was in solitary confinement at all; right? MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor, but I think that goes to damages to show his conditions in solitary will allow the jury to adequately evaluate compensatory damages. THE COURT: Does the Settlement Agreement say these are the conditions in solitary, or do they say these are the things Defendant agrees to do in the future? MS. COZEN: Your Honor, it says these are the things Defendant agrees to do in the future which shows the feasibility of being able to do them. THE COURT: But it doesn't actually show whether or not or to what extent they were being done in the past; right? MS. COZEN: That is correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: How would you tie whatever these things are to what Mr. Szubielski actually experienced? MS. COZEN: Sure, Your Honor. I think we could look at the Settlement Agreements, and let's say, hypothetically, they now require inmates in the SHU to have two hours of recreation a day, when before it might have been two hours a week. We could show that and show the

THE COURT: You know, the "clearly it wasn't

contrast that this was the conditions before, this is what

they are required to do now. So clearly, it wasn't good

good before," that sounds like a purpose that's prohibited by Rule 407.

MS. COZEN: I think Your Honor's correct, Your Honor, however, feasibility of making these changes is not prohibited by Rule 407.

THE COURT: That's true, or I think that's true.

But there seems to be a gap between -- your only evidence,

I'm guessing, that these changes are something that could

have happened and didn't. I mean, I guess you could ask

Mr. Szubielski if it says see mental health counselor three

times a week, you could ask him: How often did you see him?

Once. Would you have like to have seen such a person three

times a week? Yes.

So all right. Mr. Wan or --

MR. WAN: Your Honor, I don't think, at the outset, they're at all relevant. I think it's kind of one -- it's not a deliberate indifference case, it's a retaliation case. So as far as what could have been done, that's really not an issue here. You know --

THE COURT: Well, so the only thing that it's related to is possibly damages; right? Right?

MR. WAN: Sorry?

THE COURT: Sorry. Ms. Cozen, this is entirely related to damages or to nothing; right?

MS. COZEN: Correct, Your Honor. We think this

is a damages exhibit.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WAN: Your Honor, this is a subsequent remedial measure that still can't come in.

THE COURT: Well, is that a question or an assertion?

MR. WAN: Well, I guess, Your Honor, I believe it's a subsequent remedial measure that does not come into play here. And I think the agreement focuses on liability, too, so --

THE COURT: Yeah, I have to -- there might be a -- you know, the Rule 407 ends with the Court may admit this evidence for another purpose, and then it says such as, and it has impeachment or, if disputed, proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.

Assuming feasibility and precautionary measures is an example and not a complete statement of what it might cover, you know, I guess the first question is: I'm having a hard time -- you know, the disputed part, and maybe, for all I know, it's already in Warden Pierce's testimony, but you know, there is a precondition to admitting it, even for feasibility, which is there has to be an argument about feasibility. And I don't know whether there will actually even be an argument about feasibility. Right?

MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor, that is the quoting

of the rule.

THE COURT: All right. Well, why don't we do this: I'm going to tentatively exclude the Settlement Agreements, but certainly if there is a dispute about feasibility that surfaces, you can bring it up again. You know, plaintiffs aren't the only ones who can open a door.

Okay. What about the complaint in the 2019 case? Actually, hold on just a second, Ms. Cozen.

All right. What about the complaint in 2019? That's Exhibit 18.

MS. COZEN: Your Honor, I think in light of our discussions, we are going to agree not to present Exhibit 18.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think the rest of the objections to your things are probably best decided at some later point because none of them at least -- actually, maybe I can actually overrule a couple of the Defendant's objections.

Mr. Wan, the notice of classification assignment is Plaintiff's Exhibit 7. I take it that's the decision here, that's actually the heart of the case or it's not the Warden's decision, it's the decision of, I don't know, one of the committees that preceded the Warden?

MR. WAN: Sorry, Your Honor. Give me one second.

1 THE COURT: Sure. 2 MS. COZEN: We have a copy of the exhibit if you 3 want it. 4 MR. WAN: Yeah, that would be wonderful. Thank 5 you very much. You're asking about number seven, Your Honor? 6 7 THE COURT: Number seven, yes, the notice of 8 classification assignment dated September 1st, 2015. 9 MR. WAN: Your Honor, the hearsay objection, 10 because we don't know whose writing is actually on there, I 11 think there was a hearsay objection with who actually 12 circled it and you know --13 THE COURT: But this is the prison's record of a 14 classification decision, is it not? 15 MR. WAN: It is. THE COURT: Is it not a business record? 16 17 MR. WAN: I think the document itself would be a 18 business record, the writing on it would still be hearsay. 19 You can't see who --20 THE COURT: What does the writing say on it that 21 is --22 MR. WAN: It says, it, looks like you've been 23 approved arrow possibly the word don, and then don screw it up. I don't know. I don't know what --24 25 THE COURT: All right. Do you know what this

1 handwriting means or have a theory that you're going to advance? 2 3 MS. COZEN: Well, Your Honor, I do have extra 4 copies if you would like one. 5 THE COURT: All right. Well, why don't you hand 6 one up. 7 MS. COZEN: These are all the exhibits, both 8 Plaintiff's and Defendants, tabbed separate by exhibit 9 number. 10 THE COURT: So is there going to be any explanation of what the handwritten language means? 11 12 MS. COZEN: Your Honor, we would offer the 13 handwritten portion just for the effect on the listener 14 which is permissible, not necessarily --15 THE COURT: Why do we care what the listener's 16 effect is? 17 MS. COZEN: So our client has been housed in 18 solitary, again, for seven, eight years and he gets this 19 notice that he is now approved to move. He's naturally 20 going to be excited. He's going to be looking forward to 21 that. 22 THE COURT: Oh, it looks like, You have been 23 approved. Your client is going to say, Yeah, this was given 24 to me?

MS. COZEN: Yes. Correct, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: And I think it is cut off. What it actually says, it looks like, You've been approved. Do not screw it up. MS. COZEN: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: What do you have to say about that, Mr. Wan? MR. WAN: Well, Your Honor, we don't -- if we can't prove who says that, I don't think they come in. The handwriting is what, I think, kind of bothers me because now it's someone -- if that's what it says, it's telling Mr. Szubielski, Don't screw it up, and I don't want them to require -- you know, I don't think there's any evidence that he said that. THE COURT: So I take it this document, which has a stamp on it saying Received, actually comes from the files of the prison and not from Mr. Szubielski; right? MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor. It was Bates stamped from the DOC. MR. WAN: I think it's still -- I think the document itself --THE COURT: Well, so --MR. WAN: There's a summary judgment, Exhibit 20. So we're not positive if this one was produced by us, Your Honor. I think the point being whether -- if he got this, the record -- it is a business record. I think

the writing on this is the issue here.

THE COURT: Well, so it's pretty clear that the writing on it comes from somebody contemporaneously with knowledge.

MR. WAN: But it could be Mr. Szubielski himself, we don't know.

THE COURT: So I'm going to let it in because somebody, you know, I assume Mr. Szubielski will say, Not my writing, because I don't usually write notes to myself. And so I think it's a business record, and I think it's -- I don't actually think there's any prejudice to the defendant. I think it is a logical thing.

I think the plaintiff's argument about, you know, it's worse if you're expecting something and you don't get it than if you have no expectations. And so I think it kind of fits in with the Plaintiff's damages argument. And I don't think it really matters who in particular wrote it as long as it wasn't Mr. Szubielski.

So I'm going to admit that. Okay. That is Plaintiff's Exhibit 7.

And then the other one that I thought, the reclassification form for males, number 11, Exhibit 11, which certainly looks like more business records. What's the problem here, Mr. Wan? You know, I see it has his escape history in the middle of it. I'm not entirely sure

why you're trying to keep this out.

MR. WAN: I guess it comes in, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, but it is some official form that's part of this process. I mean, it seems -- I mean, it seems like -- in any event, I don't see a relevance. I mean, this is like the work of some -- I mean, this is part of the process; right?

MR. WAN: Yes, Your Honor. This is -- this is done as part of -- it is a business record.

THE COURT: Well, no, but I mean, it's not only a business record, but it's a business record relating to the buildup to Warden Pierce vetoing classification.

MR. WAN: Yeah, because this one is dated 7/29/2015, so I guess that would be four months before the veto. Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. You know, you may want to do things -- you may want to not confuse the jury. You may want to redact what the run date is in the top right-hand corner of this or I guess have some explanation, even though it seems pretty clear the thing is dated August 10th, 2015 at the end.

So in any event, I'm going to overrule that objection. I think it's quite relevant, and there's, so far as I can see, no unfair prejudice or anything else.

All right. Let me just see the Defendants'

exhibits. So I did cavalierly tell the Defendants earlier that all these earlier incident reports are coming in. But I do notice that every single defense exhibit is objected to.

Actually, let's skip the incident reports for a minute. Michelle Roberts, is she on the witness list, Mr. Wan or Ms. McCowan?

MS. McCOWAN: She is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So with the affidavit dated

June 31st of 2016, presumably that's not actually going to

be something you're offering; right? She's going to testify

firsthand?

MS. McCOWAN: That's correct, Your Honor, but to the extent she can't recall, we want to make sure --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, in any event, so subject to some proper use, it is not otherwise going to come in just because you have an affidavit. So I'm going to sustain that objection.

All right. What about the various classification decisions and incident reports that are Exhibits 1 through 7?

MS. MUNNINGS: Your Honor, each of these records have narratives from an officer that talk about what other people did, what people said, and so they're hearsay, and they're also highly prejudicial and confusing. They're not

going to the veto. They're he-said-she-said type of documents included in those incident reports.

THE COURT: But this is kind of like the backup for, for lack of a better word, Mr. Szubielski's prison rep; right?

MS. MUNNINGS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So let me just see if I've got the history kind of straight which is for a number of years before Warden Pierce was the Warden, Mr. Szubielski was, I guess, six years to be exact or five or six kept in solitary confinement, or the Secure Housing Unit, or however you want to call it, based on decisions that are not at issue in this case.

But the reason that Warden Pierce gives for vetoing it is, would you say, I knew there was a current investigation going on or something like that? Okay, got that.

Does he have a like part B, you know, he's a really bad guy, or is it really just, no, there was an investigation going on and, you know, intelligence that he's doing smuggling or something like that?

MR. WAN: We have things, I believe, like this and also there are other factors, including Mr. Pierce had an escape attempt as well. So I think, you know, all of this is relevant to show that, you know, yes, there is an

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initial classification with the NBC and IBCC. But then the Warden knows the, you know, I guess the most sensitive information, so that's why he can -- there are times where he does a veto. And for security purposes, that might not be privy to the lower people who do the initial classification. I think this kind of moves up to that. THE COURT: Oh, yeah. I think I've heard that testimony recently. MR. WAN: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: How much of the bad stuff that Mr. Szubielski's either done or been accused of doing that's covered in these seven exhibits is also essentially summarized in the reclassification form that immediately led up to the Warden's veto? MR. WAN: They're not, Your Honor, I think classifications. And I don't know if you remember from the other trial, but classifications are very bare bones. They may contain a statement if --THE COURT: Right. I do remember that now that you mention it. MR. WAN: So I think the incident reports are important to show in greater detail exactly what was going on and not just some --THE COURT: Well, so that's what I'm kind of

wondering, the greater detail because we have the

Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 which, among other things, under Escape History says, Walk off from work release, furlough, courtrooms, police, recovery center within the past three years. Gives him two points.

MR. WAN: Yeah, but for example in --

THE COURT: Oh, wait. I'm sorry. I guess it doesn't give him points because the box none is checked. So those are -- oh, okay. I get it. If the box was checked -- so escape history, according to this, is none. You've got age. There's something that says high severity, all felony escapes. None. Disciplinary.

So he has 15 or more years remaining to be served. Active in a worker program. Meeting. So I think you've given me a binder that has these seven documents. I think the best thing to do would be for me to have a look at them without you all staring at me and see.

You know, I guess part of what I'm concerned about would be trying to avoid -- trying to be fair in terms of what the jury would hear. You know, as I've said, they're going to hear that he was in solitary for six years. And as I've said, they're going to be told essentially that's not an issue in this case.

But in terms of the Warden's decision, you know, it's hard to completely sanitize why he was in there for six years, you know, why the Warden would even be familiar with

it. Because I think there was testimony or am I confusing this with the last case that the Warden -- yeah, I think part of your theory is the Warden knew who he was. Why did the Warden know who he was? Did they go to high school together or, you know, has the Warden been hanging around the Correctional Center for a long time and Mr. Szubielski's the kind of guy who stands out? I'm guessing it's more or less the latter, and this would all kind of fit in with that.

But it strikes me that, as you say,

Ms. Munnings, a lot of the details are prejudicial with no

probative value. It's a lot more, you know, that he had

incidents in 2000 -- you know, 2009 is a long time ago, but

2012, 2013, 2013 again, 2014.

Were any of these incidents involving smuggling or contraband?

MR. WAN: Yes, Your Honor. Sorry.

MS. MUNNINGS: Some are or like someone says someone else is sending something to Mr. Szubielski. Some are Mr. Szubielski has too much soap, or envelopes, or stamps, and so it's -- they're not really proving -- I guess, I don't know what their theory is, but they're not relevant. They're not probative and they're prejudicial.

THE COURT: All right. Well, so it seems to me that things that involve contraband or something else is a

lot more relevant than things that might involve, say, an assault or even an escape. But I think the best thing to do is for me to have a look at these, and I may suggest --well, I don't know what I may suggest, but I am thinking that particularly to the extent -- you know, it might be something where it's possible to stipulate to some prior events concentrating on the contraband ones. I'm not sure, but I think I need to look at it, and I also think I need to bring this to an end because I have something at one o'clock.

So in any event, that's as much as I plan to do with the exhibits today. And I will just tell you that if I were doing the voir dire, basically Mr. Wan or Ms. McCowan cleverly submitted basically the voir dire that I did in the last case, so I'd be starting from where they are. The one thing that I thought may be needed to be added to what they submitted was a question which you all had in your voir dire, which was essentially, you know, this isn't the way you worded, I don't think, but does the involvement of the ACLU in this cause you to jump to some conclusion or otherwise not be able to judge the case fairly? But I thought that as long as we're doing the ACLU, we might as well do the Community Legal Aid, too, even though they're probably a lot less controversial. So I was going to do some -- I had written down a question which I had imagined

as 16(a) in the submission from the State, something like,
As I mentioned before, Mr. Szubielski claims Mr. Pierce
retaliated because of Mr. Szubielski's involvement in an
earlier lawsuit. That earlier lawsuit was brought by the
American Civil Liberties Union or ACLU and the Community
Legal Aid Society or CLASI. Do you have strong feelings,
either positive or negative, about either the ACLU or CLASI?

You know, a lot of these questions where you have things, it's possible for people to be on either side of an issue, and I don't like to hint that they should be on one side or the other. So even though you only were interested in the negative, I think it's better to ask about both sides.

So in any event, I've written that down.

Hopefully, I will be giving this to some other judge, and you can deal with that person.

In any event, so that's what I would do if I were keeping this. And I'm not going to do -- I wouldn't do a jury questionnaire. For one thing, the proposed jury questionnaire is way more intrusive than I would ever do. And you know, the other thing is I think a questionnaire that's this intrusive sort of discourages people from jury service. So I'm generally not in favor of that.

I'll let you work out with the judge who's handling this exactly how jury selection and things like

that will go. I do, because I have a criminal trial going on, I expect to be using the sixth floor. So your trial will be on either the fourth floor or the second floor, I'm not sure which.

So is there anything else? I really do have to go very shortly, but is there anything else that either side wants to bring up?

MR. WAN: Your Honor, one thing I'd bring up is regarding the designations for the 30(b)(6) testimony, I think in the other case, we also, I guess, had some counter designations if something comes in. So do you want them to submit it first and then --

THE COURT: If you've got counter designations, you better go counter designate them this afternoon and tell them what they are because I don't want to get piece meal; right?

MR. WAN: That's fair, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Cozen.

MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor. We have a few more small matters.

One is our client is currently housed in Sussex, and we would like him to be moved about a week before the trial to the Howard Young facility so we can meet with him.

It's just quite far from Wilmington for us to meet with him on a regular basis to adequately prepare, and we would

request the Court allow that.

THE COURT: Well, you know, the problem is he's a State prisoner. I'm not sure that I can just direct the Department of Correction to house him, though it would make a lot of sense.

Mr. Wan, I imagine that the two of you are not actually the lawyers who give counsel to the Department of Correction as opposed to represent them in litigation?

MR. WAN: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you think there's anything you could do in this regard?

MS. McCOWAN: So Your Honor, they've asked for this. We've made videoconferencing available for Plaintiff and his counsel to communicate on whatever basis they need to. Because Mr. Szubielski has had an escape attempt from Howard R. Young, and he is currently facing these new criminal charges, the DOC's position, from what I understand from their counsel, would be that they don't want to give anything certain to Mr. Szubielski or his family given the pending criminal charges and his escape attempt.

THE COURT: Is it the case that for the trial -
MS. McCOWAN: He will be housed up here for the

trial and for some period before, but we wouldn't be -- the

DOC wouldn't be comfortable --

THE COURT: All right. So I'm not comfortable.

I wouldn't even -- I'm not very comfortable doing this when I'm dealing with the U.S. Marshals in federal prison over which I have some authority, or I don't actually have some authority, but I do have some ability to do something. I am even more hesitant to do something, particularly since it sounds to me like videoconferencing and the fact that he will be brought up here some time before the trial and will be here at the trial or be local at the trial, I'm not going to do anything more than that. What the State's doing sounds fine to me.

MS. COZEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MS. COZEN: Yes, Your Honor. We also would request that our client be allowed to wear a long-sleeved undershirt to cover any tattoos he has under --

THE COURT: I don't see a problem with that. I take it you don't have a problem with it. In fact, I mean, but, yeah, yeah. I mean, sure.

Have you asked somebody if you could do that, and they've said, No?

MS. COZEN: Opposing counsel wouldn't commit to allowing our client to wear street clothes, so we just want to make sure --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not so sure about your client wearing street clothes, but I am perfectly happy to

have him cover up tattoos and other things that are prejudicial for no good reason. You know, the street clothes, what is going to be obvious that he's in prison right now, you know, it's -- but in any event, that's not what we're talking about. But T-shirts, undershirts, yes, he can wear them.

MS. COZEN: Thank you. And the last matter to bring to your attention, we were wondering what the method for striking jurors is that this Court uses.

THE COURT: Well, I use something called the struck juror method. I'll tell you what, I've really got to go. I expect that the judge to whom this is assigned, which hopefully a magistrate judge will be getting in touch with you very quickly, and things like that which might be done differently by another judge anyhow is better discussed with them.

Okay?

MS. COZEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you all for your preparation in this. On the assumption that I won't see you again, Ms. Cline, thank you for taking the representation.

And so I will issue some order at least memorializing some of the things that I've said here, and I hope to hear back on the --

MS. CLINE: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's okay. And I hope to hear back on the consent this afternoon. All right. We'll be in recess. Thank you. DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. (Court was recessed at 12:58 p.m.) I hereby certify the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript from my stenographic notes in the proceeding. /s/ Heather M. Triozzi Certified Merit and Real-Time Reporter U.S. District Court